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Privatizing Philly vs. AFSCME DC 33 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] "One word from me and the traffic lights don't work, the bridges don't open, the trash isn't 
collected and the heat in all the city buildings is cut off," boasted former AFSCME DC 33 President Earl 
Stout in 1975. At the time that statement was made, it accurately reflected the power and practices of 
District Council 33 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the largest 
blue-collar union in the City of Philadelphia. 
In the 15 years since Stout's declaration, things have changed dramatically both for the City and the union. 
By the 1980s, the union faced a fundamental threat from the contracting out of bargaining unit work. This 
article will describe how DC 33 moved from a one-dimensional confrontational approach to its problems 
of the 1970s to a successful multifaceted fight against privatization. 
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"One word from me and the traffic lights don't work, the bridges 
don't open, the trash isn't collected and the heat in all the city 
buildings is cut off," boasted former AFSCME DC 33 President 
Earl Stout in 1975. At the time that statement was made, it 
accurately reflected the power and practices of District Council 
33 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees, the largest blue-collar union in the City of 
Philadelphia. 
In the 15 years since Stout's declaration, things have changed 
dramatically both for the City and the union. By the 1980s, the 
union faced a fundamental threat from the contracting out of 
bargaining unit work. This article will describe how DC 33 moved 
from a one-dimensional confrontational approach to its problems 
of the 1970s to a successful multifaceted fight against privatization. 
DC 33 Up to Goode 
District Council 33 is comprised of 14 semi-autonomous locals, 
10 of which form a single bargaining unit representing virtually 
all nonsupervisory, nonuniformed employees of the City. DC 33 
• Ann Cohen is president of AFSCME Local 1637. James Dooley is a 1637 steward 
and a delegate to AFSCME District Council 33. 
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has the capacity as Stout proclaimed, to shut down the city's vital 
operations. This is primarily because its bargaining relationship 
with the City predates the enactment of public sector labor 
relations legislation in Pennsylvania. The first local received City 
Council recognition in 1939, with formal recognition of the entire 
District Council being granted in 1961, a decade before similar 
rights were granted to other public employees in the state. The 
extraordinary strength of DC 33 is also related to the strength of 
the labor movement in Philadelphia during this time. 
The breadth of the District Council's representation rights is the 
foundation of its power. The union was organized around the 
sanitation workers, presently represented by Local 427. These 
2,400 workers, responsible for trash and garbage collection and 
disposal, are the historic core of the union and pose its biggest 
strike threat. Other strategic locals include those representing 
water department, corrections, health, highway, and building 
maintenance employees. 
Like other big city AFSCME councils, DC 33 expanded its scope 
and strength in the 1960s and early 1970s. During this time 
AFSCME affiliates across the country benefited from a rising sense 
of black empowerment and militancy derived from the civil rights 
movement. In Philadelphia municipal workers, who had been 
among the lowest paid, won quick and dramatic gains as a result 
of increases in federal aid to cities and the union's strategic 
bargaining position. It was during this period that Earl Stout, a 
charismatic Sanitation Department mechanic, rose through the 
ranks of Local 427 to become DC president in 1974. 
During this time, AFSCME's relationship with the City was 
characterized by direct action. Through a combination of walkouts 
and slowdowns, DC 33 could usually get its way from a city 
government that had a multitude of funding sources and could 
be intimidated by a union with a militant black leadership. The 
union's commitment to direct action was so complete that arbi-
tration was not a part of its grievance procedure until 1984. 
With federal and state cutbacks beginning in the late 1970s and 
intensifying after 1982, the terrain shifted for both the union and 
the city government. One-term Mayor William Green's hiring of 
Wilson Goode, a black Wharton Business School graduate, to the 
top nonelected post of managing director was a recognition of the 
city's growing black political base. Reflecting Green's desire to 
promote his administration as being "professionally managed," 
Green regularly touted the managerial skills of Goode. 
It was Wilson Goode who negotiated the union contract without 
a strike when Green laid off bargaining unit members in early 
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1980 in response to shrinking public aid. The new contract 
provided the union with important safeguards against future 
diminution of the bargaining unit; it prevented the City from 
contracting out work without first meeting important notice and 
economic analysis requirements. 
Goode's reputation as a hands-on manager laid the groundwork 
for his entry into city politics as a candidate for mayor who could 
capture votes beyond the black community. Goode was elected 
as Philadelphia's first black mayor in 1983, with the active and 
enthusiastic support of DC 33. The honeymoon was not to last. 
Philadelphia Under Goode 
Goode's first term as mayor was marked by cutbacks in services 
that resulted in membership losses for most AFSCME locals. 
Goode also increased contracting out of work that had historically 
been performed by union members. 
A good example of this is Local 1637, whose members had long 
been responsible for the repair and maintenance of city buildings. 
The Goode administration's response to the decay of the city's 
infrastructure was not to restaff the trades jobs which provided 
ongoing maintenance, but to subcontract for those areas in worst 
shape and neglect all others. In response, Local 1637 began using 
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newly won arbitration rights to enforce the 1980 contracting-out 
language. The union successfully utilized that language to enjoin 
the City from privatizing a public riding stable. In those parts of 
the bargaining unit where concerted attention to enforcing the 
contract was absent, however, contracting out became more 
widespread. 
Goode has often publicly expressed his ambition to run the city 
like a Fortune 500 company, and has in fact pursued policies that 
resemble those of corporate America. His obsession with the 
bottom line and his focus on the short-term at the expense of long-
term investments in human and capital resources closely reflect 
the practices and priorities of many large corporations. 
Prior to 1986, contracting out was an expedient short-term 
approach used by various department commissioners, rather than 
an overall management policy. In 1986 the union attempted to 
address contracting out and the resulting loss of jobs in negotia-
tions, and it became one of several issues at the heart of the longest 
municipal strike in the city's history (21 days). Several locals 
emerged from the strike with side-letters to the master agreement 
that stemmed contracting out and restored bargaining unit 
positions. 
However, the 1986 strike was an unpopular one with the 
membership, who widely perceived it as the result of personal 
rancor between Goode and Stout rather than an inability to resolve 
issues. The press heralded the end of the strike as an unqualified 
win for the Mayor and a crushing defeat for the union. The City 
had finally begun to tame the mighty District Council 33. 
The after-effects of the 1986 strike have led many to question 
the union's ability to use its once mighty strike weapon, and this 
uncertainty has haunted the union and influenced the actions of 
both parties. For the Mayor, it represented the beginning of his 
political comeback after the MOVE disaster, and he rode the wave 
of popularity back into the mayor's seat in 1987. 
As part of his 1987 re-election campaign, Goode announced his 
intention to contract out trash collection, making privatization the 
centerpiece of his strategy for dealing with the city's problems. 
The easiest way to justify this strategy was to blame the workers 
and union work rules for the declining quality of city services. 
Goode received strong support from the press, especially the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, which had designated itself as the leader 
of a public crusade to tame the union. DC President Stout's public 
image as autocratic, corrupt and arrogant made this crusade an 
easy one to conduct. The 1986 strike was still fresh in the minds 
of the public. Further, Stout's self-imposed isolation from the rest 
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of the local labor movement made it difficult for the union to gain 
the support of other unions. The Mayor's policy and its press 
support represented a fundamental threat to the entire union. 
The Fight in Sanitation 
The campaign against the sanitation workers, which portrayed 
them as lazy drunks, was laden with racist overtones. Because of 
their high visibility, they became the focus of Goode's campaign 
against the entire city workforce. Led by President James Sutton, 
AFSCME Local 427 immediately launched its counterattack, 
involving a variety of tactics, many of them new to a union that 
had traditionally solved problems through job actions. "We knew 
job actions would play right into their hands. It would have been 
the worst thing we could have done," explains Sutton. 
Local 427's campaign involved intensive lobbying of City 
Council, developing community allies, and taking the offensive 
with the press through a well-conceived public relations campaign, 
which directly addressed the issue of productivity. 
The Mayor's plan to privatize trash collection needed the 
approval of City Council. For months the officers and members 
of Local 427 became regular fixtures in City Council chambers 
and offices as the union presented testimony and lobbied indi-
vidual Councilpersons. "Instead of stopping work, we had 
members coming down on their days off to talk to their Council 
members," Sutton emphasized. This approach helped change the 
image of the Sanitation Local, as well as solidify support among 
Council members, who had often received political action support 
from the union. 
Local 427 started its own campaign in the community. Represen-
tatives of the local began attending neighborhood meetings across 
the city. Philadelphians United to Save City Services, led by Shafik 
Abu Tahir, became the local's most important ally. This coalition 
organization, made up of a wide range of community and labor 
organizations, had addressed a host of issues impacting the 
community, including the Mayor's closing of fire houses and 
declining services in city health centers. Philadelphians United, 
through their successful organizing of demonstrations and ability 
to get favorable press coverage, had made themselves a force to 
be reckoned with in city politics. Through the coalition and its 
own community contacts, the union brought its case directly to 
grassroots groups and labor allies. 
The union was determined to get its story on privatization to 
the public. Through a series of press releases and news confer-
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ences, the union took on the two companies bidding for the trash 
service contract, exposing their histories of criminal practices, 
corruption and anti-trust violations. Sutton began to emerge as 
a new style of union leader—professional, well-informed, and 
sensitive to the public interest. 
Local 427 also sought to energize its own ranks with the creation 
of a Publicity Committee. The Committee published a newsletter, 
involved family members, developed rank-and-file spokespeople, 
and in January 1988, after Goode had been reelected to his second 
term as mayor, organized a major rally on Martin Luther King Day. 
The fact that King died in Memphis while he was helping striking 
AFSCME sanitation workers added emotional fire to the cause of 
Local 427. The rally was an unqualified success, reinvigorating 
the fight against privatization. It also gave new credibility to 
Sutton, especially compared to DC 33 President Stout, who was 
absent that day. 
\ A New Direction for the Union 
The City Council eventually rejected the Mayor's plan to 
privatize the Sanitation Department, but Goode expanded his 
privatization agenda to other areas, including the City's public 
health centers and nursing home. With the expansion of the City's 
efforts to privatize city services, others became involved. AFSCME 
DC 47, the city's white-collar union, along with Local 488 of DC 
33, organized a campaign with other groups—including senior 
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citizens, homeless advocates and health care consumers—to fight 
the privatization of health services. Once again, Philadelphians 
United played a leading role in bringing key constituency groups 
together and bringing new allies to the sanitation workers' struggle, 
as the common interests of these groups became more apparent. 
The whole tenor of the union's campaign in the community, the 
press and City Council was to emphasize that City workers were 
taxpayers and consumers of city services, as concerned with the 
quality of those services as every other Philadelphian. When the 
City Council alleged that restrictive union work rules necessitated 
contracting out, Sutton countered that the union could offer 
suggestions that would save the city money. 
This response characterized the union's approach to the City's 
charge that union workers were unproductive and that union rules 
prohibited technological change. In Sutton's office today, photos 
spanning the better part of this century show the changes in sani-
tation work. From horses and wagons to the first truck, the first 
compactor and so on. These pictures show, according to Sutton, 
"If you don't change with the times, you don't survive." 
The union met the issue of productivity head-on, instead of 
denying it. Sutton suggested that new equipment and redesigning 
of routes would lead to more efficient operations, in contrast to 
Stout who viewed any discussion of change as surrender. Sud-
denly, Stout's confrontational style had become obsolete. 
In May 1988 the delegates of DC 33, in a bitterly contested 
election, voted James Sutton the new DC president, removing 
Stout from a position he had occupied for 14 years. This election 
marked not only a change in leaders, but a change in approach. 
The first task confronting Sutton upon his election was the 
negotiation of a new contract. The old one was set to expire on 
June 30, 1988. While contracting out had been the union's issue 
in 1986, now privatization was the city's; its negotiating team 
viewed unions as "counterproductive" and "dragons that should 
be slain" in pursuit of the bottom line. Some observors believe 
that Goode played his contracting-out card too early as part of his 
election campaign, allowing the union enough time to respond. 
Still, the threat of privatization hung over contract negotiations. 
It is doubtful that anyone in the administration anticipated the 
degree of broad-based success the union's anti-privatization 
campaign would enjoy. 
The negotiations finally concluded in late July with the union 
agreeing to early retirement incentives as the means of workforce 
reduction. Layoffs and privatization had been averted. The funda-
mental threat to the union had passed. But as Sutton has warned, 
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"Privatization is not dead. Wherever we're not competitive, it can 
be held over our head." 
The degree to which public sector unions can adapt to the threat 
of privatization is crucial to their future. As it enters the 1990s, 
DC 33 combines both the old and new methods of labor relations. 
Local 394, representing workers in the Water Department, for 
example, has continued to rely on direct militant action. The Water 
Department, a self-funded entity, has not been subject to the same 
kinds of fiscal pressures as other city departments and has 
responded by increasing bargaining unit jobs when confronted 
by Local 394 on contracting-out issues. 
Local 403, perhaps the hardest hit of all locals by contracting 
out, won restoration of highway and street lighting repair work 
through its 1986 side-letter and subsequent enforcement arbitra-
tions. After a three-year legal battle, the union has finally seen 
those positions reinstated and has established a minimum level 
of employees. 
In Local 1637 a policy of vigorous contract enforcement through 
the grievance procedure, in concert with small-scale job actions 
and aggressive court action when necessary, has been in practice 
for a number of years. As a result, the city has been forced to think 
long and hard before attempting to contract out 1637 work. 
Recently, when the Department of Public Property attempted to 
circumvent the notice provisions of the contracting-out language 
in the union contract, the union was able to force a settlement 
that included large wage payments and guaranteed overtime. The 
City was unwilling to risk another loss in court and was not eager 
to be further embarassed by union members on an informational 
picket line at the site of the proposed contracting out. 
Preparations for a major arbitration regarding the privatization 
of prison health services are underway. Arbitration victories in 
Local 1637 have forced management to adopt a much more 
cautious approach to contracting out in the Department of Public 
Property. The price of complex litigation—and the price of losing-
has become a powerful threat for the union. That threat must be 
extended throughout the bargaining unit. 
Conclusion 
These various victories show that the union is finding its way 
in a changing environment. Work with Philadelphians United is 
continuing. The union is actively building new allies in the 
community and becoming reinvolved in the labor movement. The 
union is convinced that spreading its message and expanding its 
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relationship with the broader community is crucial at a time when 
various interests are competing for their piece of an ever-shrinking 
pie. 
The union retains a public relations firm for the use of the 
various locals and the District Council. The union's powerful 
political action committee has played key roles in voter registration 
and local election efforts and is now moving more actively into 
lobbying. The big political and economic issues that affect our 
members get played out in the press and City Council. The union 
cannot afford to have its viewpoint missing from the dialogue. 
Membership involvement continues to play a central role. Suc-
cesses in City Council have come as a result of the combined 
impact of lobbying, public relations, and demonstrations in City 
Council chambers. Informational picketing and other job actions 
that directly confront management and contractors have also 
proven extremely effective. 
"This is only a beginning. There needs to be more coordination 
inside the union. We need to train our people and meet privati-
zation head on," concludes DC 33 President Sutton. It appears that 
AFSCME in Philadelphia is well on its way to doing just that. • 
Resources 
Economic Policy Institute 
One of the ways the Reagan Revolution (being continued by 
our kinder and Bushier President) has established its power is 
through its control of the way public issues get framed. And one 
of the ways right-wing, anti-union conservatives shape public 
debate is through the intellectual products of their "think tanks." 
Progressive political forces, including the labor movement, have 
a new think tank of our own—the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 
EPI produces brief, highly readable research studies and reports 
on various economic policy issues from taxes to plant closings. 
And EPI has done three of the best independent studies of 
privatization: 
The Limits of Privatization, by Paul Starr (20 pages, $3). 
The Emperor's New Clothes: Transit Privatization and 
Public Policy, by Sclar, Schaeffer and Brandwein (37 pages, $8). 
Prisons for Profit: Public Justice, Private Interests, by John 
D. Donahue (31 pages, $4). 
These are available from: Economic Policy Institute, 1730 
Rhode Island Avenue N.W., #812, Washington DC. 20036. 
